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ESSAY
The Dangers of Missing the Forest: The Harm
Caused By VeriFone Holdings in a Tellabs World
Carol V. Gilden,* Michael B. Eisenkraft,** and Josh Segal***
INTRODUCTION
“A complaint [alleging securities fraud] adequately pleads scienter
under the PSLRA [(“Private Securities Litigation Reform Act”)] only if
a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the
facts alleged.”1 The Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd. (“Tellabs”)2 definitively set the standard for
evaluating allegations of scienter in securities fraud class action

* Carol V. Gilden is the Resident Partner at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC’s Chicago
Office and a member of the Securities Fraud/Investor Protection practice group. Ms. Gilden has
extensive experience in protecting the rights of investors, including five years of experience as an
enforcement attorney in the SEC and serving as lead or co-lead counsel in numerous securities
class actions representing public pension funds, Taft-Hartley Benefit Funds, private pension
funds, and high net worth individuals. Ms. Gilden served as the President of the National
Association of Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys (NASCAT), the preeminent trade
association for securities class action attorneys, from April 2007–April 2009. This Essay evolved
out of Ms. Gilden’s moderation of a panel discussion, on the topic of “Behavioral Economics and
State of Mind: Pleading and Proving Scienter in Securities Fraud Cases,” at the Loyola University
Chicago School of Law’s Second Annual Institute for Investor Protection Conference in October
2012, titled “Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection.”
** Michael B. Eisenkraft is a Partner in Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC’s New York
office and a member of the Securities Fraud/Investor Protection practice group.
*** Josh Segal, Harvard Law School class of 2013, assisted in this Essay while working as a
Summer Associate at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC in 2012.
1. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324 (2011) (citations omitted).
PSLRA refers to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)), which governs
allegations of securities fraud. PSLRA’s reforms “included, inter alia, new requirements for
those who may serve as lead plaintiff and plaintiffs’ counsel in securities fraud cases, reducing
the availability of joint and several liability, and heightened pleading standards.” Vaughn R.
Walker, Class Actions along the Path of Federal Rule Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 446 n.6
(2012) (citing Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to
Deterrence of Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1415, 1416 n.1).
2. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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complaints for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Under Tellabs, “[t]he
inquiry . . . is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give
rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual
allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard.”3 The Supreme
Court reaffirmed this standard in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano
(“Matrixx”),4 holding that in making a determination about scienter on a
motion to dismiss, “the court must review all the allegations
holistically.”5
Despite the Supreme Court’s repeated and clear instructions, some
lower courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit, have retained their prior
practice of analyzing each allegation in isolation. They have justified
this retention as a first level of analysis that precedes the Supreme
Court-mandated “holistic” review of the plaintiffs’ allegations.
Specifically, in Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp. (“Zucco”),6 a
2009 case decided after Tellabs, the Ninth Circuit endorsed a two-step
analysis for scienter. First, the court must analyze whether the
plaintiff’s individual allegations of securities fraud create a strong
inference of scienter.7 Second, if no allegation, standing alone,
adequately alleges scienter, the court will perform a “holistic” review of
the plaintiff’s allegations to establish whether the allegations combine to
create a strong inference of intentional conduct or recklessness.8 More
recently, the Ninth Circuit in In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Securities
Litigation (“VeriFone Holdings”)9 held that this two-step analysis is
still proper in light of Matrixx.10 VeriFone Holdings justified its
continued endorsement of the two-step analysis by claiming that “a dual
analysis remains permissible so long as it does not unduly focus on the
weakness of individual allegations to the exclusion of the whole
picture.”11
This Essay argues that the Ninth Circuit’s continued endorsement of
a two-step analysis is misguided because it risks framing the question of
scienter tendentiously. As recent findings in behavioral economics
suggest, the psychological influence of analyzing each allegation in
3. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23.
4. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
5. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1324.
6. 552 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009).
7. Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 992.
8. Id.
9. 704 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2012).
10. See VeriFone Holdings, 704 F.3d at 702 (“Matrixx on its face does not preclude this [twostep] approach and we have consistently characterized this two-step or dual inquiry as following
from the Court’s directive in Tellabs.”).
11. Id. at 703.
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isolation likely will cause judges to dismiss securities fraud lawsuits
more frequently than under a purely holistic analysis of the allegations.
Legally, the step of determining whether any allegation alone creates a
strong inference of scienter constitutes a pollutant that interferes with
the holistic analysis of scienter mandated by Tellabs and Matrixx.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by explaining the
requirements for pleading scienter under the PSLRA as established by
the Supreme Court. Next, Part II discusses the Ninth Circuit’s and other
courts’ continued insistence on retaining a two-part analysis for
evaluating allegations of scienter in securities fraud litigation, and
provides a hypothesis as to why these courts have retained this test
despite conflicting Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part III then analyzes
the consequences of the two-part analysis using behavioral economics
and Ninth Circuit case law.
I. PLEADING SCIENTER UNDER THE PSLRA
The PSLRA requires litigants to plead “with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.”12 Although Congress left the PSLRA’s meaning of “strong
inference” undefined,13 the Supreme Court has supplied a definition:
“To qualify as ‘strong’ . . . , an inference of scienter must be more than
merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”14 In
failing to expressly define “the required state of mind,” Congress also
left scienter’s meaning to the judiciary to decipher.15 The Supreme
Court has held that the term scienter encompasses “intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”16
Every federal appellate court to
subsequently consider the issue of scienter in securities fraud class
actions has held that recklessness will also meet the standard,17 though
each has formulated the standard somewhat differently.18
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006).
13. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (“Congress left the
key term ‘strong inference’ undefined . . . .”); id. at 321–22 (“‘Congress did not . . . throw much
light on what facts . . . suffice to create [a strong] inference,’ or on what ‘degree of imagination
courts can use in divining whether’ the requisite inference exists.” (citation omitted)).
14. Id. at 314. This heightened pleading standard only applies to scienter.
15. See id. at 329.
16. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
17. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319 n.3. As Geoffrey Rapp notes, the legal concept of recklessness
emphasizes risk, which makes “[t]he manner in which we estimate probabilities . . . an essential
component of any theory of recklessness.” Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of
Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 155 (2008). And as behavioral economics has
demonstrated, people often estimate probabilities inaccurately. See id. at 153–61.
18. See, e.g., Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 82 (1st Cir. 2002) (“high degree of
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In Tellabs and Matrixx, the Supreme Court set out clear standards for
analyzing whether a complaint adequately pleads scienter under the
PSLRA for purposes of a motion to dismiss. In Tellabs, the Supreme
Court specified a practical construction of the PSLRA’s strong
inference standard for scienter using three different “prescriptions.”19
First, as with any motion to dismiss, a court must accept all allegations
in the complaint about scienter as true.20 Second, courts “must consider
the complaint in its entirety,” specifically “whether all of the facts
alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter,
not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets
that standard.”21 Third, in deciding whether the pleaded facts give rise
to the required strong inference of scienter, a court must “take into
account plausible opposing inferences” as the “strength of an inference”
is “inherently comparative.”22 The Court in Tellabs emphasized the
importance of the second prescription, reiterating elsewhere in its
opinion that “the court’s job is not to scrutinize each allegation in
isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically.”23
In Matrixx, the Court echoed the importance of its second
“prescription,” reminding lower courts that in “making this [scienter]
determination, the court must review all the allegations holistically.”24
Scienter in Matrixx concerned knowledge about adverse reactions to a
cold remedy drug, Zicam, including anosmia (loss of smell).25 After the
reminder about evaluating scienter “holistically,” the Supreme Court
listed a series of allegations that the plaintiffs in Matrixx made
regarding scienter, including that Matrixx hired a consultant to review
Zicam, prevented a scientist from using the name of the product at issue
in a presentation, and issued a press release suggesting that “Zicam does
not cause anosmia when, in fact, it had not conducted any studies
recklessness”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2000) (“conscious recklessness”);
Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (“severe
recklessness”); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001) (“severe
recklessness”); Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200,
207 (5th Cir. 2009) (“severe recklessness”); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550
(6th Cir. 1999) (“conscious disregard”); Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“extreme recklessness”).
19. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 322–23.
22. Id. at 323.
23. Id. at 326.
24. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324 (2011) (quotations omitted).
25. See id. at 1314 (“Respondents claim that Matrixx’s statements were misleading in light of
reports that Matrixx had received, but did not disclose, about consumers who had lost their sense
of smell (a condition called anosmia) after using Zicam Cold Remedy.”).
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relating to anosmia and the scientific evidence at that time.”26 The
Supreme Court concluded that the class plaintiffs’ allegations, taken
together, gave rise to a “cogent and compelling inference . . . that
Matrixx acted with deliberate recklessness (or even intent) at least as
compelling as any opposing inference,” and thus found that the
plaintiffs had adequately plead scienter.27 In other words, Matrixx
reaffirmed the already emphasized importance of the “holistic” analysis
and demonstrated how courts should conduct it.
II. STAYING THE COURSE: LOWER COURTS’ RETENTION OF AN
INDIVIDUALIZED SCIENTER ANALYSIS AFTER TELLABS AND MATRIXX
Even in the aftermath of Tellabs and Matrixx, many courts have
ignored the Supreme Court’s prescription that scienter should only be
evaluated holistically and instead have followed a two-step process.
Under this approach, the court first evaluates each allegation of scienter
independently and, only after that individualized analysis is complete,
does the court engage in, as a second step, a holistic analysis of the
cumulative effects of the allegations. A complaint will survive a motion
to dismiss on scienter grounds under the two-step approach if a court
determines that scienter has been adequately pled under either the
individualized or the holistic analysis.
The Ninth Circuit is the leading proponent of the two-step inquiry. In
Zucco, Judge Bybee stated that “we recognize that Tellabs calls into
question a methodology that relies exclusively on a segmented analysis
of scienter” and that “our prior, segmented approach is not sufficient to
dismiss an allegation of scienter.”28 In an unexpected turn, however,
Zucco did not abandon the “prior, segmented approach” in favor of the
holistic approach prescribed by the Supreme Court in Tellabs. Instead,
the Ninth Circuit retained the old segmented approach, but grafted it
onto the Supreme Court’s holistic approach as the first of two steps.
Specifically, Zucco stated:
[F]ollowing Tellabs, we will conduct a dual inquiry: first, we will
determine whether any of the plaintiff’s allegations, standing alone,
are sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter; second, if no
individual allegations are sufficient, we will conduct a “holistic”
review of the same allegations to determine whether the insufficient
allegations combine to create a strong inference of intentional conduct
or deliberate recklessness.29
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1324–25 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F. 3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 992.
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According to Zucco, the first of the two steps is derived from preTellabs case law, which had “developed a set of rules to analyze
different types of scienter allegations.”30 Specifically, the Zucco court
admitted that “we have continued to employ the old standards in
determining whether a plaintiff’s allegations of scienter are as cogent or
compelling as an opposing innocent inference.”31 Zucco justified the
continued use of this first step by claiming that Tellabs did not
“materially alter the particularity requirements for scienter claims”
previously established in Ninth Circuit case law, but rather only added
“an additional ‘holistic’ component to those requirements.”32 The
Zucco court’s interpretation of Tellabs thus incorrectly sought to
preserve the elaborate framework that courts had previously applied to
scienter allegations.
So far, the two-step inquiry has been an enduring feature of the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis, reappearing in both circuit-level and district-level
decisions.33 Most recently and significantly, in VeriFone Holdings, the
Ninth Circuit provided a detailed analysis and justification of its
decision to retain the two-step approach.34 In VeriFone Holdings, the
Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s determination on scienter,
holding that while none of the individual allegations created the
necessary “strong inference” of scienter, the plaintiffs’ complaint
adequately pled “intentional or reckless conduct on the basis of a host of
allegations.”35 This conclusion—that “the sum is greater than its
parts”36—led the Ninth Circuit into a philosophical review of its twostep process for analyzing scienter in securities fraud litigation.
First, the VeriFone Holdings court acknowledged that in Matrixx, the
Supreme Court reiterated that courts must “review ‘all the allegations
holistically’ when determining whether scienter has been sufficiently

30. Id. at 991.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 987.
33. See, e.g., N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir.
2011) (“Under . . . Ninth Circuit law, we conduct a two-part inquiry for scienter . . . .”); WPP
Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1052 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)
(incorporating the Tellabs test through the express language of the N.M. State decision); In re
NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C 08-04260 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117807, at *17–37 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 12, 2011) (undergoing a step-by-step application of the two-part test to six relevant
factual circumstances); Curry v. Hansen Med., Inc., No. 5:09-cv-05094-JF (HRL), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 96697, at *12–22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) (defining scienter generally and
applying the two-part test).
34. See In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2012).
35. Id. at 704. See also id. at 708–10 (analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ allegations).
36. Id. at 698.
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pled.”37 After describing the two-step standard it adopted in Zucco, the
Ninth Circuit declared that “Matrixx on its face does not preclude this
[two-step] approach,” and reiterated that it believed that the two-step
inquiry followed “from the Court’s directive in Tellabs.”38 The Ninth
Circuit then stated that “[p]ost-Matrixx, our cases have employed varied
approaches—some discuss first the sufficiency of specific allegations
and then conduct a holistic review, while others conduct only a holistic
analysis,”39 before concluding that “[b]ecause the Court in Matrixx did
not mandate a particular approach, a dual analysis remains permissible
so long as it does not unduly focus on the weakness of individual
allegations to the exclusion of the whole picture.”40
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the potential
effects of its two-step analysis. First, the Ninth Circuit claimed that
“where an individual allegation meets the scienter pleading requirement,
whether we employ a dual analysis is most likely surplusage because
the individual and the holistic analyses yield the same conclusion.”41
The Ninth Circuit then acknowledged the potential danger inherent in
its two-step process, noting the “risk, of course, is that a piecemeal
analysis will obscure a holistic view,”42 and citing to the Sixth Circuit’s
conclusion in Frank v. Dana Corp. that the “method of reviewing each
allegation individually before reviewing them holistically ‘risks losing
the forest for the trees’ and that such a method is unnecessarily
inefficient.”43 This self-reflection by the Ninth Circuit brings into focus
a puzzling question: Why, when a two-step analysis creates either
surplusage or the danger of obscuring a holistic view, does the Ninth
Circuit continue to support this approach, which adds danger of error
and inefficiency without any obvious offsetting benefits?
This question becomes even more puzzling insofar as other circuits
have criticized the Ninth Circuit’s two-step approach as inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent.44 The Third Circuit, for example, found
that the first move in the two-step analysis merely “graft[ed] Tellabs’s
37. Id. at 702 (quoting Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324 (2011)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 703.
41. Id. at 702.
42. Id. at 703.
43. Id. (citing Frank v. Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954, 961 (6th Cir. 2011)).
44. See Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 273 n.46 (3d Cir. 2009)
(arguing that the Ninth Circuit “misinterpret[ed] the Supreme Court’s [Tellabs] decision”); Frank
v. Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954, 961 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Our former method of reviewing each
allegation individually risks losing the forest for the trees. Furthermore, after Tellabs, conducting
an individual review of myriad allegations is an unnecessary inefficiency.”).
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holistic analysis onto the Ninth Circuit’s earlier jurisprudence as an
extra layer.”45 The Sixth Circuit asserted that an initial analysis of each
separate allegation was out of step with Matrixx, arguing that aside from
breaking with binding precedent, “conducting an individual review of
myriad allegations is an unnecessary inefficiency.”46
Yet, despite this criticism, the Ninth Circuit is hardly alone in
employing a two-step analysis of scienter in securities fraud cases.
Even where other circuits have not expressly endorsed the two-step
framework, they regularly subscribe to it as a matter of practice.47 And
they tolerate piecemeal analysis in the lower courts, so long as such
analysis is followed by holistic review. The Eight Circuit has put it
most bluntly: “When a party asserts . . . that six factors collectively
warrant a particular conclusion, we do not assume the district court
failed to view the six collectively merely because it discussed them one
at a time.”48 Even the Third Circuit—so critical of two-step
analysis49—sustained a dismissal despite the fact that the district court
discussed the entirety of the complaint very briefly, and only after “a
lengthy discussion as to why each scienter-related allegation added
little, if anything to plaintiffs side of the scienter scale.”50 Other federal
courts have taken the same or similar approaches.51
So, why, given widespread criticism—and, at least for the Ninth
Circuit and Third Circuit, substantial self-reflection—do some courts
cling to the two-step framework for reviewing scienter allegations? The
popularity of the method, which finds its way into judicial analysis even
when uninvited, no doubt springs from its seeming reasonableness.
And that seeming reasonableness, in turn, arises from the structure of
legal thinking, its tendency toward incrementalism, and the logical
45. Avaya, 564 F.3d at 273 n.46.
46. Dana Corp., 646 F.3d at 961.
47. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1301.1 (3d ed. 2004) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that
“[v]irtually every court to consider the pleading standard in securities fraud cases after Tellabs
has engaged in some form of an element by element analysis”).
48. In re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 2008). The dissent,
meanwhile, found the practice inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 678 (Ambro, J.,
dissenting).
49. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
50. City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 442 F. App’x 672, 675 (3d Cir.
2011).
51. See, e.g., In re Bos. Scientific Corp. Sec. Litig., 686 F.3d 21, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2012)
(asserting that the district court failed to consider scienter-related arguments “holistically”);
Ashland, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 648 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2011) (sustaining a district
court’s dismissal of the complaint, despite the lower court’s use of “itemized analysis,” because
the “factual allegations, when considered together, [did] not give rise to a strong inference [of
scienter]”).

10_GILDEN.DOCX

2013]

5/8/2013 2:09 PM

The Harm Caused By VeriFone Holdings

1465

orientation to which it aspires.
To begin, the two-step method satisfies a lawyer’s inherent desire for
structure. In complicated securities fraud suits, itemized analysis of
each individual allegation provides some structure to what might
otherwise be an overwhelming task.52
Structure is virtually
synonymous with legal thinking. Law students learn to write and think
according to rigidly structured formulae,53 with the expectation that
“lawyers and judges will ‘both look for a tightly structured analysis that
makes your conclusion seem inevitable.’”54 Lawyers reserve some of
their highest praise for those practitioners who reach that ideal55 and
regularly criticize “unstructured analysis.”56 Structure also promotes
the sort of exactitude that facilitates appellate review.57
Second, by incorporating preexisting doctrine, the two-step approach
seemingly preserves decades of securities fraud jurisprudence. In this
sense, the two-step analysis allows the Ninth Circuit to retain some of
the virtues of common law incrementalism and its minimalism.58 By
preserving existing doctrine, this sort of incrementalism theoretically
enables the sequential aggregation of information, thereby “draw[ing]
on the accumulated wisdom of past experience.”59
More than anything else, however, the two-step analysis appears
rational and is superficially quite appealing. In theory, holistic review
can act as a failsafe measure, saving whatever meritorious complaints
52. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 47, § 1301.1.
53. Jessica E. Price, Imagining the Law-Trained Reader: The Faulty Description of the
Audience in Legal Writing Textbooks, 16 WIDENER L.J. 983, 995–1004 (2007) (describing and
critiquing the dominant law school writing curriculum’s emphasis on “IRAC,” which teaches
students to analyze legal problems by stating the legal issue, expressing the applicable rule of
law(s), explaining and applying the legal rule to a particular fact pattern, and briefly stating the
legal conclusion).
54. Id. at 998 (quoting RICHARD K. NEUMANN JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING:
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 100 (5th ed. 2005)).
55. See, e.g., Marsha S. Berzon, David Feller—A Remembrance, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 227, 228 (2003) (“David [Feller] remained, twenty and thirty years after he had left the
active practice of law, the gold standard, the person all his former colleagues would quote to
younger lawyers like me. Thus, I was told, time and again: ‘As Dave Feller says, a brief should
be written so tightly that the first sentence of each paragraph can become the summary of
argument.’”).
56. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 477 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Cf. United States v. Perry, 228 F. App’x 557, 558–59 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Carillon Health Sys., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished opinion).
58. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234, 2242
(2006) (“Minimalism is grounded in an appreciation of the common law method and its
appropriate place in constitutional law.”).
59. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1422, 1475 (2011) (citing David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891–92 (1996)).
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that would otherwise succumb to the scrutiny of piecemeal analysis. As
a matter of pure logic, there appear to be few objections to the adoption
of a failsafe measure. As explained below, however, even judges are
human and not creatures capable of pure logic. Therefore, this rationale
for the two-step analysis falls short.
III. LOSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES: A BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
CRITIQUE OF THE TWO-STEP ANALYSIS
The two-step analysis appears relentlessly rational, but appearances
can be deceiving. As courts often warn, “reviewing each allegation
individually before reviewing them holistically risks losing the forest
for the trees.”60 As the Ninth Circuit itself has recognized, sometimes
“the sum is greater than the parts.”61
Behavioral economics adds scientific heft to these timeworn adages.
Experimental evidence demonstrates that the framing of a problem
affects its resolution in irrational but predictable ways.62 When faced
with a logically identical choice between two outcomes, our preferences
vary with the emotional context in which the problem is presented, or
“framed.”
For instance, Tversky and Kahneman asked 152 people to respond to
the following problem (Problem 1):
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the
exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as
follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.

60. Frank v. Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954, 961 (6th Cir. 2011). See also Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n
of Colo. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 316 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Seeing the forest as well
as the trees is essential.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 47, § 1301.1 (“In employing any
element by element analysis the danger that courts should recognize is that it is particularly easy
to lose the forest for the trees. . . . [A] rigid quantitative method, such as counting the number of
facts for and against scienter, will tend to underemphasize the interplay among the facts and is
less appropriate than a more flexible approach that strives to keep the overall picture in mind.”
(emphasis added)).
61. In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 2012).
62. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology
of Choice] (using experimental results to show that “[t]he psychological principles that govern the
perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce
predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways”); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251
(1986) (conducting various experiments to show that a preliminary analysis of a decision “frames
the effective acts, contingencies, and outcomes”).
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If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people
will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?63

Tversky and Kahneman then presented a second group of 155 people
with the same disease outbreak scenario, but with a different
formulation of the program options (Problem 2):
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will
die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.
Which of the two programs would you favor?64

Seventy-two percent (72%) of Problem 1 respondents chose Program A,
while the remaining 28% of Problem 1 respondents chose Program B.65
Thus, the majority choice in Problem 1 was “risk averse.” In Problem
2, the results were reversed: 22% of respondents chose Program C,
whereas 78% chose Program D.66 Thus, the majority choice in Problem
2 was “risk taking.” That is to say, though the outcomes were identical,
the fact that in one set of questions the outcome is framed in terms of
the number of lives saved, and in the other by the number of lives lost,
resulted in a pronounced shift from risk aversion to risk taking.
Psychology, not logic, determined preferences. This phenomenon
equally affects experts deciding questions within their professional ken,
whose deliberative processes ought to be disciplined by training and
experience.67 It also has been observed in judges’ behavior.68
Establishing a default, or baseline, is a particularly powerful form of
framing.69 Scholars have observed a “default bias”—that is, people
frequently prefer some sort of baseline option.70 Confronted with “new
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice, supra note 62, at 453.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 369 (2011) [hereinafter
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW] (public health professionals); Barbara J. McNeil,
Stephen G. Pauker, Harold C. Sox, Jr. & Amos Tversky, On the Elicitation of Preference for
Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982) (physicians); Tversky & Kahneman,
Psychology of Choice, supra note 62, at 453 (university faculty and physicians).
68. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 797–98 (2001) (“The framing of the settlement decision affected judges in
our study.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy
Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1240 (2006) (“The decision frame affected the judges.”).
69. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1209, 1214 (2011) (“Once gatekeepers find markers of hard work, intensity, optimism, and
enthusiasm by people inside the organization who seem dedicated and sincere, they relax their
guard.”).
70. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338
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options, decision makers often stick with the status quo alternative—for
example, to follow customary company policy, to elect an incumbent to
still another term in office, to purchase the same product brands, or to
stay in the same job.”71 A particular variant of the phenomenon, known
as “anchoring,”72 which describes when quantitative judgments are
disproportionately influenced by an initial numerical reference point,73
has been observed among judges.74 And some scholars speculate that
the status quo bias, in particular, may inflect judicial decision making.75
In any case, the broader phenomenon of default biases is certainly
familiar to jurists. In recognition of the influence of baselines on realworld decisions, the Supreme Court recently asked, “Shouldn’t the
default rule comport with the probable preferences of most [affected
individuals]?”76
The two-step analysis explicitly adopted by the Ninth Circuit (and
implicitly by other courts) risks framing the issue in an unbalanced
manner by establishing an unnecessary baseline. Whatever answer a
court generates on the first part of the two-step inquiry will affect its
analysis of the subsequent holistic inquiry. That the procedure enlists
the judge in establishing the baseline may exacerbate this default bias
because the investment of time, energy, and resources in generating the
baseline also creates some measure of investment in the outcome of the
initial component of the analysis.77 The first step of the evaluation is
(2003); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(K)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149 (2001).
71. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
72. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (noting that the relevant
“anchor” is “usually the status quo”).
73. See generally KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, supra note 67, at 119–28; Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE
1124, 1128–30 (1974).
74. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences:
The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 188, 197–99 (2006) (German “legal professionals,” mostly judges); Birte
Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Last Word in Court: A Hidden Disadvantage
for the Defense, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 713–17 (2005) (German judges); Birte Englich &
Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1547–49 (2001) (German judges).
75. See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and Dress
Codes, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 306 (2007) (“When courts interpret laws, the judges’ status quo
bias may undermine the implementation of laws dictating change.”); Goutam U. Jois, Stare
Decisis Is Cognitive Error, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 98 (2009) (“When given a pre-existing set of
legal rules, judges will be hesitant to move away from the status quo.”).
76. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012).
77. Scholars have long observed that individuals who invest time, energy, and resources in a

10_GILDEN.DOCX

2013]

5/8/2013 2:09 PM

The Harm Caused By VeriFone Holdings

1469

sticky; it pulls the ultimate outcome toward it.
Indeed, evidence from within the Ninth Circuit suggests this
stickiness affects outcomes in practice as well as theory. A Boolean
search on LexisNexis for the citation for Zucco, with at least three
mentions of scienter and the key word “dual inquiry,” brought up
twenty-two federal district court opinions. Each reviewed scienter
allegations in detail and each explicitly recognized Zucco’s command to
conduct a “dual inquiry”—first, an individualized analysis for each
scienter allegation, and then a holistic analysis. As illustrated in Table
1, below, in only one of these twenty-two cases was there an explicit
discussion of a conflict between the outcome of the individualized
inquiries and the holistic analysis. (In a second case, there was a
possible conflict between an individualized and a holistic analysis.) At
the very least, the individual and holistic analyses pointed in the same
direction in over 90% of the studied cases, thereby providing at least
anecdotal evidence of “stickiness.”

particular position display an irrational commitment to it. See, e.g., Gillian Ku, Deepak Malhotra
& J. Keith Murnighan, Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision-Making: A Study of
Auction Fever in Live and Internet Auctions, 96 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 89, 91–92 (2005) (“People who have freely chosen a course of action also tend to
narrow their attention and focus on information that helps them justify further commitment.”);
Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen
Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 27, 41–42 (1976)
(explaining that commitment frequently escalates when “additional time, effort, and resources”
are invested). And some researchers have attempted to extend the theory of “endowment effects”
to items that they wish to own. See James E. Heyman, Yesim Orhun & Dan Ariely, Auction
Fever: The Effect of Opponents and Quasi-Endowment on Product Valuations, J. INTERACTIVE
MARKETING 7, 10–11 (2004) (“[P]eople’s valuation for an item changes based on whether they
own the item.” (citation omitted)). Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a
long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.” (emphasis
added)).

10_GILDEN.DOCX

1470

5/8/2013 2:09 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

TABLE 1
SCIENTER USING INDIVIDUALIZED VERSUS HOLISTIC ANALYSIS
Case Citation

Match or Conflict Between
Individualized and Holistic
Analyses

Kovtun v. Vivus, Inc., No. C 10-4957 PJH, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139548 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012)

Match (no scienter)

Kyung Cho v. UCBH Holdings, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d
1190 (N.D. Cal. 2012)

Match
(scienter some defendants)

RS-ANB Fund, LP v. KMS SPE LLC, No. 4:11-CV00175-BLW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53407 (D. Idaho
Apr. 16, 2012)

Match (no scienter)

RS-ANB Fund, LP v. KMS SPE LLC, No. 4:11-CV00175-BLW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129595 (D. Idaho
Nov. 7, 2011)

Match (no scienter)

In re Nvidia Corp. Securities Litigation, No. C 0804260RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117807 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 12, 2011)

Match (no scienter)

Curry v. Hansen Medical, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-05094JF(HRL), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96697 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
25, 2011)

Match (no scienter)

Kyung Cho v. UCBH Holdings, Inc., No. C 09-4208
JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100580 (N.D. Cal. May
17, 2011)

Match (no scienter)

Louisiana Pacific Corp. v. Money Market 1 Institutional
Investment Dealer, No. C 09-03529 JSW, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32414 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011)

Match (no scienter)

In re Bank of America Corp. Auction Rate Securities
(ARS) Marketing Litigation, No. 09-md-02014 JSW,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18208 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011)

Match (scienter for portion of
class period)

Allstate Life Insurance Co. v. Robert W. Baird & Co.,
756 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Ariz. 2010)

Match (scienter for some
defendants)

In re Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. C 09-00546 JSW,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143948 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2010)

Match (no scienter)

In re Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. Securities
Litigation, No. CV-08-1821-PHX-GMS, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81410 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2010)

Conflict (scienter when
holistic, potentially not when
individual)78

Desserault v. Yakima Chief Property Holdings, LLC,
No. CV-09-3055-RMP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56483
(E.D. Wash. June 3, 2010)

Match (no scienter)

78. See Medicis Pharm. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81410, at *33 (“Though Plaintiffs’
allegations may not be sufficient to give rise to the requisite state of mind if considered in
isolation, they do give rise to a cogent inference of scienter when considered collectively.”).
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Match or Conflict Between
Individualized and Holistic
Analyses

In re Century Aluminum Co. Securities Litigation, 749
F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

Match (no scienter)

In re Taleo Corp. Securities Litigation, No. C 09-00151
JSW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13696 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17,
2010)

Match (no scienter)

In re Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. Securities
Litigation, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Ariz. 2009)

Match (no scienter)

In re PMI Group, Inc., No. C 08-1405 SI, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 101582 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009)
In re Cadence Design Systems, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
In re PMI Group, Inc., No. C 08-1405 SI, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56709 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2009)
Brant v. Kipp, No. CV 08-8320 AHM (RZx), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48742 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2009)
City of Alameda v. Nuveen Municipal High Income
Opportunity Fund, No. 08-4575 SI, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42637 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2009)
Teamsters Local 617 Pension & Funds v.
Apollo Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 763, 796 (D. Ariz.
2009)

Match (scienter)
Match (no scienter)
Match (no scienter)
Match (no scienter)

Match (scienter)
Match with some Defendants,
potential conflict with others
(scienter as to some
defendants)

Moreover, a review of these opinions confirms that the individualized
analyses added little, if any benefit, to the holistic conclusion. Listing
each individual factor and determining whether each one, on its own,
sufficiently alleges scienter simply does not make the holistic analysis
better and, as discussed above, potentially makes it worse. This
potential to pollute a holistic analysis of securities fraud allegations is
further confirmed by psychology. The narrow framing of problems
often generates bad reasoning. Narrow frames simplify analysis,79
which may encourage mental laziness by implying the availability of
preexisting answers. Such frames certainly depart from the assumption
that rational decision makers “make their choices in a comprehensively
inclusive context, which incorporates all the relevant details of the
present situation.”80 And, in many contexts, such narrow frames have
been derided for generating systematic deviations from rational
79. Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice, supra note 62, at 456–57.
80. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1459 (2003).
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behavior.81
By contrast, as Daniel Kahneman points out, “[b]roader frames and
inclusive accounts generally lead to more rational decisions.”82 As
Judge Posner has put it in a separate context, “[i]t is true that zero plus
zero equals zero. But evidence can be susceptible of different
interpretations, only one of which supports the party sponsoring it,
without being wholly devoid of probative value for that party.”83
Piecemeal consideration of each allegation thus risks disregarding this
probative quality—it risks losing the forest for the trees.
By ignoring the significance of contextual evidence, narrow framing
also undermines the neutrality of the forum in a way that broader
framing does not. Piecemeal parsing of the complaint hurts plaintiffs.
They must make their case without the contextual cues that hold
together traditional narratives.84 Plaintiffs might use contextual cues to
enhance the strength of their claims.85 A holistic inquiry, by contrast, is
neutral between plaintiffs and defendants. “Just as facts innocent in
themselves may appear more suspicious in the company of other facts,
so too can a fact that seems damning when presented alone sometimes
be explained away by reference to other circumstances.”86
81. See, e.g., id. at 1459–60 (collecting numerous examples); Alok Kumar & Sonya
Seongyeon Lim, How Do Decision Frames Influence the Stock Investment Choices of Individual
Investors?, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1052, 1063–64 (2008) (providing empirical evidence suggesting that
individual investors who narrowly framed their decisions were more likely to be under
diversified, and to sell successful investments and hold onto losing investments).
82. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, supra note 67, at 372.
83. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Posner, J.). See also In re Bos. Scientific Corp. Sec. Litig., 686 F.3d 21, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2012)
(Boudin, J.) (“True, allegations that are individually insufficient can sometimes combine together
to make the necessary showing. To take the simplest example, one known episode of an adverse
drug reaction might be meaningless; an undisclosed collection of repeated and serious adverse
reactions might permit an inference of conscious wrongdoing or recklessness because the adverse
implication is so obvious.”).
84. Cf. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1694 (2009) (“We can think of narrative as the architecture of context . . . .
To understand a legal dispute, one must comprehend the narrative context it inhabits.”).
85. See Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence
of Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1415, 1430. See also Michael J.
Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers: Inferring Scienter from Core
Operations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 507, 540 (2012) (“[T]he vagueness
surrounding precisely how senior management knew about the facts pertaining to the misleading
statements is simply one factor to consider in the scienter analysis.”).
86. Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 273 n.46 (3d Cir. 2009); accord
Meltzer Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Tellabs’s]
directive that a complaint must be read in its entirety cuts both ways. Although a defendant
cannot gain dismissal by de-contextualizing every statement in a complaint that goes to scienter, a
plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal by reliance on an isolated statement that stands in contrast to a
host of other insufficient allegations.”).
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Tellabs’s injunction that scienter allegations should not
be evaluated individually is not just binding law; it is also good binding
law as it discourages bias. As shown above, the Ninth Circuit’s attempt
to retain separate review of individual scienter allegations as part of a
two-step process does not eliminate the problem of bias inherent in an
individualized analysis of allegations. Instead, the two-step process
allows the individualized analysis to pollute the holistic analysis and
unnecessarily adds another level of review, building inefficiency and
confusion into the process. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit should
let go of its piecemeal analysis of scienter allegations, follow the
Supreme Court’s dictates in Tellabs, and solely analyze scienter
holistically.

